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IN 2020, ELECTRIC car maker Lucid Motors brought in revenue of $4 million. Five years later, sales had risen impressively, to more than $1 billion. In 2025 alone, sales grew 68%. That sounds like a success story, and through that lens, it is. And yet, over that same period, the company’s stock dropped more than 89%.
What happened?
A better question is: What didn’t happen? Despite growing sales, the company has struggled to turn a profit. On sales of $1.3 billion last year, Lucid posted a loss of $3.8 billion. It’s experienced production problems and management turnover. It’s seen its competitors cut prices. As a result, it’s been forced to issue new shares, thus diluting the value of existing investors’ holdings, just to keep the lights on.
In fairness to Lucid, the road to success is rarely a straight line. Arizona State University professor Hendrik Bessembinder studies the performance of public companies, and the results are sobering. In new research, he found that, over the past 100 years, the median return among stocks trading on U.S. exchanges was negative 6.9%. Only a minority of stocks, in other words, made any money at all.
Why are these results so dismal? Four factors stand out.
The first is emotion—specifically, investors’ emotions. After Lucid went public in late-2020, its stock began rising quickly, and in the early months of 2021, the shares gained nearly 500%. What was driving those gains? Since the company was just starting production, very little can be attributed to the company’s financial results. Instead, it was simply investor excitement around the electric vehicle market and the optimistic view that Lucid would become the next Tesla. But no sooner did the stock rise that it fell again. And in the years since, it’s been an overwhelmingly downward slide for investors.
In the last interview he gave before he died in 1976, Benjamin Graham compared the stock market to a seesaw. “The present optimism is going to be overdone and the next pessimism will be overdone.” And that causes stocks to go to extremes. Fifty years later, Graham’s observation seems no less accurate. Indeed, investment manager Cliff Asness has argued that, because of the internet, the impact of emotions on the market is even worse today. Due to what he calls “the less-efficient market hypothesis,” inaccurate information can spread much more quickly today than it did in the past. You may recall the phenomenon in which a group of day traders, led by a YouTube personality who called himself Roaring Kitty, was able to drive up the stock of a nearly-bankrupt company for no rational reason. That couldn’t have happened in the years before social media.
Another factor that can drive stock prices is government action, and this also explains part of Lucid’s slide. When the government ended tax credits on electric vehicles last year, that made electric cars much more expensive for consumers. And contrary to intuition, this year’s higher gas prices haven’t done much to entice buyers back to EVs.
On the other hand, government action can sometimes be positive. In 2017, for example, Congress voted to cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, significantly boosting public company profits.
Perhaps the most obvious factor that can drive stock prices is competition. This can take a few different forms. Coke and Pepsi, for example, have been battling for more than 100 years, but their relative positions don’t change very much. At this point, neither company is going to go out of business as a result of the other.
In his book The Innovator’s Dilemma, the late Clayton Christensen described a much more disruptive form of competition—the sort that upends industries entirely, such as when 19-year-old Bill Gates outsmarted IBM. At the time, IBM was the most dominant company in the computer industry, but over time its position faded. It underestimated how important personal computers would become and didn’t take the market seriously. Years later, it ended up selling off its PC business entirely, and today makes very little hardware.
The same sort of thing happened to BlackBerry, to Kodak and to Polaroid, among others. Like IBM, all of these companies had enormous resources. But, according to Christensen, it was their success that became their greatest weakness, because it caused them to underestimate threats and to downplay the likelihood that anything fundamental might ever change. Ken Olson, the founder of Digital Equipment Corporation, a leader in minicomputers in the 1960s and 1970s, famously asserted, “There is no reason anyone would want a computer in their home.”
The tricky aspect of the innovator’s dilemma, though, is that it isn’t universal. Consider the early years of the auto industry. Before automobiles gained popularity in the early 1900s, it’s estimated that there were 4,000 companies in the horse-and-carriage business. The right move for any of these companies would have been to try to transition into automobile manufacturing. Carriage makers, especially, had relevant skills and were best positioned to make this leap. But they adopted a collective mindset that the automobile wasn’t going to succeed, dismissing cars as “devil wagons.” But one of these carriage makers, Studebaker, did correctly assess where things were going and successfully transitioned to making automobiles. The rest failed, faded away or switched into other businesses. Companies, in other words, can be very good at one thing but lose their footing in the face of change. That’s a key factor behind Bessembinder’s findings.
A final factor that can cause companies to stumble: random events. Consider, for example, what occurred in Thailand in 2011. Heavy rainfall resulted in flooding that caused large industrial areas to become submerged. This included the factories of hard drive manufacturers Western Digital and Seagate, causing their stocks to drop 35% and 45%, respectively. Both recovered, but this is an example of how even good companies can run into bad luck.
Years of research has shown how difficult it is to predict stock prices. Bessembinder’s new work, however, makes an additional important point, which is that, for all of the reasons discussed here, and likely others, stocks face many more roads to potential demise than to success. Thus, to succeed at stock-picking doesn’t just require research and hard work. It requires an almost prophetic ability to identify the tiny handful of stocks that will turn into homeruns. But since the odds are so steeply against success, that’s a key reason I see it as so important to stick with the simpler and less risky alternative of index funds.
Adam M. Grossman is the founder of Mayport, a fixed-fee wealth management firm. Sign up for Adam’s Daily Ideas email, follow him on X @AdamMGrossman and check out his earlier articles.
Great article, thanks. All of this reminds me why index fund investing is such a good option. Picking winners is well beyond my humble capabilities.
Before I spend time commenting only to have it deleted with no explanation, what are the rules regarding comments? I was not able to find any. I assume no profanity, but what else?